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ABSTRACT: I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical conse-
quence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that my 
views make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my 
critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunder-
standings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory. 
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1. The ‘must’ 
As I note in my introductory piece (2003), a widely shared intuition about the concept 
of logical consequence tells us that if a conclusion follows logically from some prem-
ises then that conclusion follows by logical necessity from those premises. The con-
cept of logically necessary consequence is not as transparent as we might want, but it 
is linked somehow to the modal concepts of analytical implication, a priori implication 
and implication by necessity (tout court). I share the widely shared intuition, and I have 
emphasized the links of the concept of logical consequence with all these modal con-
cepts in several of my writings (see, e.g., (1998/9), (2000a)). In my view, a fair re-
quirement on the adequacy of a technical notion of logical consequence (such as the 
model-theoretic one) demands that no argument which is an instance of that technical 
notion be a (definite) instance of logically contingent implication, whatever ‘logically 
contingent implication’ ought to be understood to mean. Or in other words, I demand 
(i): 
 
(i) all model-theoretically valid arguments are instances of implication by logical 
necessity. 
 
 Manuel García-Carpintero (2003) endorses this requirement of purely extensional 
adequacy, but he insists that a stronger requirement is needed. He endorses a require-
ment he locates in Etchemendy, that a good technical notion of logical consequence 
be “a conceptual analysis” of the pre-theoretic notion. According to García-
Carpintero, then, we also need (among other things) something of the form of (ii): 
 
(ii) Necessarily (all model-theoretically valid arguments are instances of implication 
by logical necessity), 
 
where the ‘necessarily’ means something as strong as ‘it is conceptually or analytically 
true that’. I think (ii) is certainly too strong if interpreted this way; hardly any notion 
intended as a technical or scientific version of some common concept has ever been 
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proposed as a conceptual analysis of the common notion, and there is nothing wrong 
in that. On the other hand, if ‘necessarily’ means something like ‘it is metaphysically 
necessarily true that’, (ii) is somewhat more reasonable, since often the technical or 
scientific version of a common concept turns out to be (approximately) metaphysically 
necessarily coextensional with the common notion (even if the metaphysical necessity 
of coextensionality was not explicitly intended). But I don’t think even this weaker 
reading of (ii) provides a mandatory requirement on the model-theoretic notion of 
logical consequence. Accidentally coextensional technical concepts which are theoreti-
cally fruitful and worth exploring may be hit upon by the philosopher or scientist; 
their exploration cannot be banned, or even denied philosophical import. 
 García-Carpintero’s main reason for imposing (ii) as a requirement appears to be 
epistemological. He says that “a “merely material” generalization … is the sort of gen-
eralization which we are in a position to assert only after checking all cases” (my empha-
sis); he also says that proposals of technical notions “establish (if anything) some mo-
dality-involving relationship between the property captured by the pre-analytical con-
cepts and the precisely defined ones. Any purported justification of this kind, if it is justi-
fication enough and is provided for a true proposition, justifies a claim having a modal 
force absent in merely material generalizations” (my emphases). The idea seems to be 
that if we are to be able to assert, or to know something like (i) we cannot at the same 
time fail to have come to be able to assert, or to know something stronger, like (ii), for 
accidental generalizations cannot be known or asserted by themselves if they quantify 
over an infinite number of cases (as (i) does). I think this is not a good line of argu-
ment. First, it is far from clear that one cannot come to possess minimally appropriate 
justification, e.g. of an inductive sort, for an accidental generalization without having 
examined all the cases the generalization quantifies over. Second, and more important, 
generalizations like (i) are often put forward as theses or hypotheses without more 
than an inductive justification (which may or may not be sufficient to allow us to “as-
sert” them); a justification for their necessitations (things like (ii)) need not have been 
provided, and for all we know need not exist. Significantly, I think, the two examples 
García-Carpintero mentions (the technical concepts of logical consequence and of a 
computable function) are cases where technical concepts are employed in the absence 
of more than a basically inductive justification for merely non-necessitated generaliza-
tions like (ii), codifying minimal adequacy conditions for those concepts1. 
 This is not to deny the importance of finding arguments allowing us to establish (i) 
(or the stronger (ii), suitably interpreted) more conclusively. But García-Carpintero 
appears to have misunderstood me as being unsympathetic not merely to imposing (ii) 
as a requirement, but also to imposing (i). On the contrary, I am sympathetic to (i), 
                                                   
1 In the case of model-theoretic logical consequence, I think there is a conclusive argument for (i) as re-
stricted to first-order languages, which is basically an extension of an argument of Kreisel; but no 
conclusive argument exists for (i) in general. (See my (2003) and (1998/9).) In the case of a technical 
concept intended as a scientific version of the informal notion of a computable function, the gener-
alization analogous to (i) for which we basically do not have more than empirical evidence is the gen-
eralization ‘all functions computable in the informal sense are computable in the technical sense’, 
known as ‘Church’s thesis’. 
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and I insist that if it were falsified then we would have a serious argument against the 
model-theoretic notion of logical consequence. García-Carpintero’s misperception 
seems to arise from two sources: one is his running together and indistinctly the two 
modal requirements (i) and (ii), and the other is my purely exegetical view that Tarski 
(in the key passages of (1936) discussed by García-Carpintero) did not endorse (i) as a 
requirement, but merely (iii): 
 
(iii) all model-theoretically valid arguments are arguments such that no argument 
with the same logical form has true premises and a false conclusion.2 
 
The condition on model-theoretically valid arguments embedded in (iii), being an argu-
ment such that no argument with the same logical form has true premises and a false conclusion, is 
what Tarski calls ‘condition (F)’. (F), and hence (iii), unlike (i), does not contain any 
modal concept whatsoever. Of course, the fact that I hold that Tarski only demanded 
(iii) should not lead anyone to believe that I side with him on this. But the piece of 
exegesis is hardly disputable, despite a common, but fortunately waning misreading of 
the relevant passages originating in Etchemendy’s work. I won’t go again into the de-
tails of my exegesis; for this, I refer the reader to my (1998) and (2000b). 
 But García-Carpintero suggests that even the exegesis as such is wrong. According 
to him, Tarski explicitly enunciated (i) as a requirement. I will briefly rebut what I take 
to be García-Carpintero’s most significant arguments for saying this. 
 One of these arguments appeals to his distinction between exegesis and mere biogra-
phy. Allegedly, my main or only reason for claiming that Tarski demanded just (iii) is 
his documented skepticism towards modal notions, but not any objective exegetical 
ground to be found in the relevant passages of (1936) (in which Tarski would suppos-
edly be embracing modal requirements like (i)). I could not disagree more, and I am 
confident that the reader of my historical papers will agree that I have fundamentally 
and essentially attempted to provide textual arguments for my exegetical claims. These 
claims concern fundamentally what the texts explicitly say, not what Tarski thought 
but did not say. 
 Not surprisingly, García-Carpintero has misunderstood some of the purely textual 
considerations for my exegesis that I take to be definitive. For example, he says that I 
have offered persuasive reasons for interpreting Tarski’s use of the word ‘must’ in his 
own formulation of condition (F)3 as signaling a certain kind of universal quantifica-
tion, but he suggests that this is compatible with that quantification being one over 
possible worlds or models existing in other possible worlds, hence a modal quantifica-
                                                   
2 Actually, Tarski employs a somewhat different notion of model than the one common nowadays, so 
‘model-theoretically valid’ means something different for him than for us, but I’m glossing over this 
difference for present purposes. See my (2000b) for an explanation of the difference. 
3 Tarski’s formulation is, I recall, this: “(F) If, in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X, the 
constants - apart from purely logical constants - are replaced by any other constants (like signs being 
everywhere replaced by like signs), and if we denote the class of sentences thus obtained from K by 
‘K'’, and the sentence obtained from X by ‘X'’, then the sentence X' must be true provided only that 
all sentences of the class K' are true” (Tarski (1936), p. 415). 
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tion. This fails to take into account the fact that my only textual reasons for thinking 
that (F), and hence (iii), make merely non-modal quantifications (over arguments or re-
placements) are incompatible with the quantifications being modal. One of these rea-
sons is that Tarski says that (F) can be formulated without problems with the help of 
“scientific semantics”, but obviously he could not have said this if (F) contained a 
modal quantification—regardless of his exact views about modality. Another textual 
reason is that Tarski claims to have a proof of his requirement that he doesn’t bother 
to give, and such a proof is clear enough under the assumption that his requirement is 
(iii) and that our model theory postulates some reasonable models (in fact, in my 
(2000b) I have noted that Tarski gave a similar proof in writings other than (1936)); 
nothing similar can be said of (i), even if understood as making a quantification over 
possible worlds.4 Further, there is the straightforward consideration that the ‘must’ in 
(F) is most naturally read as emphatic and non-modal. All readings of which I am 
aware, except the one just put forward by García-Carpintero, see (F) as entirely non-
modal, as a condition quantifying merely over all arguments of a certain class. This is 
true of Etchemendyan and anti-Etchemendyan readings alike, and it should not be 
confused with the matter whether Tarski demanded (i)—as the Etchemendyans say—
or merely (iii).  
 García-Carpintero claims also that if Tarski were imposing a non-modal require-
ment, then this would trivialize the attainment of the goal of justifying the appropriate 
adequacy claim; there would not be a sufficient “contrast” between the model-
theoretic concept of logical consequence and the condition embedded in the adequacy 
claim. It is easy to see that this claim is false, and even the modest (iii) illustrates this 
falsity. We simply do not have a proof of (iii) for arguments of second- and higher-
order languages when we take (as usual today, but probably not in Tarski’s 1936 view) 
our models to be set-theoretical. A convincing argument for (iii) in this case is bound 
to be, if it exists, highly non-trivial. 
 Can we expect a conclusive proof of (i)? Maybe. At least I’m fairly certain that no 
conclusive counterexamples to (i) have been provided. But it might be thought that 
such counterexamples could be extracted from Ignacio Jané’s (2003) considerations. I 
don’t think they could; it is worthwhile to explain why. (I’m not claiming that Jané 
means to use his considerations in this way. In fact, he is explicit that his worries are 
mainly about what is the most fruitful mathematical notion of model-theoretic higher-
order validity, and not so much about capturing a pretheoretic notion.)  
                                                   
4 A curious exegetical error of García-Carpintero concerns a passage in which Tarski says that his “pro-
posed treatment of the concept of consequence makes no very high claim to complete originality. The 
ideas involved in this treatment will certainly seem to be something well known, or even something of his own, to many a 
logician who has given close attention to the concept of consequence and has tried to characterize it 
more precisely. Nevertheless it seems to me that only the methods which have been developed in re-
cent years for the establishment of scientific semantics, and the concepts defined with their aid, allow 
us to present these ideas in an exact form” (Tarski (1936), p. 414). The italicized text has been taken 
by García-Carpintero to be an indication that Tarski is referring to a modal requirement like (i), a re-
quirement that any logician could take as “something of his own”. But the quotation in context 
makes it textually transparent that the “ideas” referred to are informal ideas about models and satis-
faction, which can only be “presented in an exact form” with the help of Tarskian semantics. 
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 There is a second-order sentence a such that the statement ‘ValT(Æ,a)’ (in the 
terminology of my introductory piece (2003)) is (set-theoretically) equivalent to the 
continuum hypothesis; similarly with another sentence b, the statement ‘ValT(Æ,b)’ 
and the negation of the continuum hypothesis. This means that either a is a model-
theoretic consequence of the empty set of premises or b is. If (i) is true, then, a is a 
logically necessary consequence of the empty set of premises or b is. Does this dis-
credit (i)? It might seem so, but in fact it will be so only under one further assumption: 
 
(iv) all arguments (Æ,X) (with no premises, and conclusion X) which are instances 
of logically necessary implication are such that the (set-theoretic) statement 
‘ValT(Æ,X)’ is not set-theoretically equivalent to a mathematically “strong” 
proposition.5 
 
Why accept (iv)? I have no idea, and as I mentioned in my introductory piece (2003), I 
think there are reasonable counterexamples to (iv) (see my (1998/9)).  
 But aside from this, it is worthwhile to insist that a certain possible reason for ac-
cepting (iv) is bad. If we accepted or expected something like (ii), with ‘necessarily’ un-
derstood as ‘it is conceptually true that’, then virtually anything false of the notion of 
logically necessary consequence would be false of the model-theoretic notion of valid-
ity. So if we accepted (ii), and we accepted, for example, that the claim that a sentence 
X follows by logical necessity from the empty set of premises is not (set-theoretically 
equivalent to) a mathematically “strong” claim, then it would follow that the statement 
‘ValT(Æ,X)’ is not (set-theoretically equivalent to) a mathematically “strong” claim. So 
we would have (iv). Do we have (iv), then? No, because there is no reason to accept 
(ii) to begin with. Compare the case of a Tarskian defined truth predicate, ‘TrueT’. If 
this predicate and the pretheoretical truth predicate were conceptually related in a way 
analogous to that in (ii), then presumably, since the claim that a sentence X is true 
does not refer to sets, we would be forced to conclude falsely that the claim ‘TrueT(X)’ 
does not refer to sets. It is clear that the corresponding version of (ii) is to be rejected 
in both cases.  
2. The ‘heptahedron’ 
The extension of the model-theoretic notion of logical consequence depends essen-
tially on the assumed class of logical constants. What is this class? It is reasonable to 
say that the proponent of the model-theoretic notion ought not to answer something 
like “The (biggest) class of constants that makes my proposal extensionally correct”. 
This would make his proposal suspiciously unfalsifiable (or nearly so). An independ-
ent characterization of the class of logical constants is needed by the Tarskian. But 
characterizing the class is not easy. I have conjectured that it is a hopeless task if one 
                                                   
5 We saw in my introductory piece how Etchemendy used tacitly a related assumption in order to reject 
the extensional correctness of the model-theoretic notion of higher-order consequence. See also my 
(1998/9). 
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wants to do it without using pragmatic notions, and in particular without using more 
than the resources of Tarskian semantics, and in (2002) I have attacked a number of 
characterizations of this and other kinds. Gila Sher’s (1991) characterization uses only 
the resources of Tarskian semantics, and in fact is a refinement of a proposal made by 
Tarski himself. In her (2003) she has attempted to rebut my criticisms. The failure of 
her rebuttal is illuminating. 
 Sher’s proposal is, in essence, that a logical constant is one whose extension is in-
variant under isomorphisms of models, and that it must be assigned an extension in all 
models. I had claimed that predicates with an empty extension over all models, like 
‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ satisfy this condition, but are not traditional 
logical constants. And if we take them as logical constants, then the sentences 
‘"x(~unicorn(x))’, ‘"x(~heptahedron(x))’ and ‘"x(~male widow(x))’ will come out 
model-theoretic logical consequences of every set of sentences (along with many other 
sentences which are intuitively not logically true)6. This is really bad news for Sher’s 
proposal7. 
 Sher’s first counterobjection is that these predicates are not defined over all mod-
els, that, e.g., ‘unicorn’ is not defined over universes containing “non-zoological, or at 
least … non-biological, objects—numbers, thoughts, planets, etc”. This sounds odd; if 
anyone asks me if it is defined whether a planet is a unicorn or not, I will say without 
hesitation that it is, and that it is defined that it is not. More importantly: when I took 
it that Sher would make the natural assumption that ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and 
‘male widow’ are defined over all models, I was following her own natural usage in 
(1991), where all sorts of terms from natural language are considered as being defined 
over all models8. Even more importantly: if Sher insists that ‘unicorn’ is not defined 
over all models, the critic can simply create a new term, ‘unicorn#’, by merely stipulat-
ing that it has the same extension where ‘unicorn’ is defined and the empty extension 
elsewhere; my points go through for ‘unicorn#’ (and ‘hepthahedron#’ and ‘male 
widow#’). 
 Sher seems to feel that the shaky claim that the predicates I gave are “undefined” 
over some models will sound ad hoc, or even that it will just postpone the difficulty (as 
I just noted). She proposes to adopt the stipulation I just mentioned. However, 
somewhat confusingly, she adopts it not for new terms, but for ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahed-
ron’ and ‘male widow’ themselves. What is her defense then? In the case of ‘unicorn’, 
her defense is that the universe of some models includes a nonempty subset of uni-
corns. This will be so in models with “fictional” unicorns. To this I have no objection, 
except that her original presentation of her theory contained no indication that she 
                                                   
6 I take this opportunity to correct an unaccountable typo in my discussion of these matters in my (2002). 
On page 19 of that paper, please replace all occurrences of ‘"x"y’ with occurrences of ‘"x$y’. 
7 William Hanson’s (2003) critique of Sher is essentially the same, although my way of putting it is per-
haps simpler. Notice that ‘"x(~unicorn(x))’ is presumably synthetic and knowable only a posteriori, so 
if it came out as a model-theoretic logical truth, we would have a serious reason to doubt the truth of 
(i). I agree with most of the points made in Hanson’s substantial and yet pellucid discussion. 
8 I would have thought that only artificial terms stipulated not to be defined over some models would fail 
to meet the condition in question. 
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spoke of ‘models’ in a sense different from the one usual in model theory and espe-
cially in discussions of model-theoretic logical consequence, i.e., models as certain set-
theoretical entities built out of actually existing urelements. (Much of the recent phi-
losophical discussion over model-theoretic logical consequence is simply unintelligible 
without this tacit assumption.) 
 So Sher’s models contain non-actualized elements. Her real theory is then not ade-
quately described in (1991) and is instead closer to a theory proposed some years ear-
lier by Timothy McCarthy, according to which a logical constant is one whose exten-
sion is invariant under isomorphisms of possible models (where ‘possible’ may mean 
‘conceptually possible’, ‘epistemically possible’ or ‘metaphysically possible’, among 
perhaps other things). It was in order to undermine this theory that I proposed the ex-
amples ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’. Their extensions are empty in all possible 
models, however one looks at the matter, and so they are invariant under isomor-
phisms of possible models. What is Sher’s defense now? 
 She fiddles a bit with the meaning of ‘heptahedron’, claiming that it is ambiguous 
even as I defined it, and that some of its acceptations are after all compatible with the 
supposition that it might not have an empty extension. She claims, for example, that 
some possible one-sided surfaces can be called ‘heptahedra’ without doing violence to 
the meaning I gave to ‘heptahedron’—“regular polyhedron of seven faces”. Of course 
Sher’s claim turns on how we understand ‘regular’ and ‘polyhedron’. But suppose we 
grant the claim. In reply I only have to insist on focusing on the intended acceptation, 
according to which an ‘heptahedron’ ought to be a two-sided surface. (Significantly, 
she does not develop a similar counterobjection for ‘male widow’.) 
 Her substantive counterobjection is designed to deal with the case in which ‘hep-
tahedron’ has the intended meaning. But the substantive counterobjection is puzzling. 
She says that the problem is that her stipulation about how to assign an extension to 
‘heptahedron’ (in the models over which it’s not defined) fails after all to capture its 
meaning; then she seems to suggest that without the meaning having been captured, 
the question whether ‘heptahedron’ is a logical constant in her technical sense simply 
does not arise. Why is the meaning of ‘heptahedron’ not captured by the stipulation 
mentioned above? Because under this stipulation the class-function assigned to ‘hep-
tahedron’ that maps models into extensions drawn from those models (the surrogate 
“meaning” of ‘heptahedron’) is the same as that of other words with a different intui-
tive meaning, such as ‘non-self-identical’. 
 This reply fails for two reasons. One of them is simply that, if Sher demands that 
the appropriate class-functions assigned to two words with different meanings be dif-
ferent, then there will be vast numbers of expressions to which Sher’s theory will be 
inapplicable. For example, surely the predicate ‘x ¹x’ gets the same class-function as 
the predicate ‘$y(x=y & x ¹y)’, but Sher would obviously want her theory to be appli-
cable to them (and to count the two predicates as logical).  
 The second reason is that the objection to Sher, as noted above, can be run with 
‘heptahedron#’. Here we don’t intend to capture a preexisting meaning, we just define 
the meaning of the expression ad hoc. If the theory of class-functions over models that 
Sher’s theory relies on is not fine-grained enough to provide different surrogate mean-
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ings for ‘heptahedron#’ and ‘non-self-identical’, the problem is a problem for the the-
ory, not for intuitive distinctions. The theory is directly applicable to ‘heptahedron#’, 
and it yields the undesirable result that it is a logical constant. 
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